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Abstract
The posting system used in major league baseball to obtain free agent
players from Japan has some similarities and many di¤erences from the
transfer system used to obtain foreign free agents in European football.
This paper uses auction theory to assess the e¢ ciencies (or lack of) in the
posting system and to suggest alternatives.
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The transfer system in European football is well known and very lucrative
for professional clubs. Large amounts of money change hands and world quality
players move among clubs such as Real Madrid and Chelsea. Little known
to Europe and most of North America is the transfer system used in major
league baseball called the posting system. The posting system is currently
used only for Japanese players wishing to move to North America (curiously
the system does not operate in reverse). The system lacks the suspense and
glamour of the European system, but it is growing and it could reach out to
other countries in the near future. Indeed, the world took notice in November
of 2006 when the Boston Red Sox paid a record $51 million for the exclusive
rights to negotiate with pitcher Daisuke Matsuzaka of the Seibu Lions club. The
rules and characteristics of the European transfer market are quite well known
to readers of this journal, but the posting system might seem a mystery. Its
rules are very di¤erent and they were probably set up for di¤erent reasons. This
paper uses auction theory to explore the di¤erences between the two systems
and to assess the e¢ ciencies of the posting system.
1 The Posting System in MLB
The posting system developed as a result of complaints by Japanese professional
baseball clubs following the case of Hideo Nomo. Nomo, a pitcher, wished to
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leave his Japanese club, the Kintetsu Bu¤aloes, and play for the Los Angeles
Dodgers, but could not secure a release from his contract. Since Nomo could
release himself from his Japanese contract by retiring, he did so, then promptly
signed a new contract with the Dodgers in 1995. Many Japanese baseball fans
left their interest in Japanese baseball behind to follow the performances of
Nomo in North America. The fear was then that the best Japanese players would
follow Nomo, resulting in losses in attendance and television ratings in Japan.
The posting system was agreed upon by MLB and Japanese baseball ( the Puro
Yakyu or Professional League) as a way to both discourage Japanese players
from moving to major league baseball (MLB) and to provide compensation to
Japanese clubs. Japanese players who are without contracts in Japan are not
subject to the posting system. The system rst came into use in the winter
of 1999 with the purchase of Ichiro Suzuki by the Seattle Mariners from the
Japanese club Orix Blue Wave.
A Japanese player who wishes to leave his Japanese club and move to MLB
must notify his club. The club can then agree to place the player on a posting
list with any other players on any other Japanese clubs who also wish to move.
Nothing prevents a MLB club from discussing the possibility of posting a player
with the players agent before the posting period closes (November to March).
The posting list is then provided to the Commissioner of MLB who noties all
MLB clubs of the posted players. Interested MLB clubs submit a sealed bid
to the Commissioners O¢ ce within four days. The Commissioner opens the
bids and noties the Japanese club of the amount of the highest bid, but not
who the bidding club is. The Japanese club has 30 days to accept or reject
the bid and the bid is not subject to negotiation. If rejected, the players rights
are retained by the Japanese club and the player cannot be posted again until
the next o¤-season. If the bid is accepted, the Japanese player must agree to
a playing contract with the winning bidder by the close of the posting period.
Only at that time does the Japanese club receive the winning funds. If the
player cannot agree to a playing contract, his rights revert back to his Japanese
club and no payment is made.
The posting system is not heavily used since only the top Japanese baseball
players have any chance of being signed by MLB clubs. Since its inception
in November of 1999, only twelve players have used the system and only eight
have signed contracts with MLB clubs1 . For the most part, the winning bids are
quite low ($300,000 to $1 million) compared to European standards, perhaps
indicating only a passing interest by the MLB club. Three notable exceptions
are the winning bids of $13 million, $11 million and $51 million paid in the years
2000, 2003 and 2006 for the players Ichiro Suzuki, Kazuhisa Ishii and Daisuke
Matsuzaka. In these three cases, and most of the others, the players Japanese
clubs were in nancial di¢ culty, requiring the sale of the player to generate
needed revenue. MLB clubs are free to bid to their maximum value for the
player since the transfer fee does not count towards the team payroll (which is
taxed above a threshold level). Revenue sharing is also used with the objective
1Source: http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Posting_System
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of making the distribution of revenues in MLB more equitable. Any club paying
a large amount for a Japanese player, or any other player, will only receive a
fraction of the players contribution towards team revenue.
The rules incorporated in the posting system are in stark contrast to the
rules used in the European transfer system. Like the posting system, players
can be sold across clubs and the player receives none of the transfer fee. The
player must then agree to a new contract with the bidding club before the
transfer fee is paid. If unsuccessful, the transfer is voided and the players rights
remain with the original club. Like the posting system, transfers can only be
made during specic periods of the year, the months of January and August.
Those are the only similarities. The top executive of each countries football
league does not get involved in the sale of a player, except to approve the sale in
a perfunctory way after all the agreements have been settled. Clubs wishing to
sell players can negotiate transfers with any club they choose, although rather
oddly, the players agent is usually involved in negotiating the transfer fee of
which the agent may receive a percentage. Players may request to be placed
on a transfer list if they wish to leave their club, but clubs may also transfer
players without their initial consent. The bidding for players is not restricted
to only one bidder and bidding wars are frequent. Transactions are only loosely
regulated, if at all, and scandals are frequent2 .
Major league baseball and Japanese baseball chose to design a very di¤erent
transfer system from that used in most of the rest of the world. In the next
section, we use auction theory to explore the design of the posting system.
2 An Auction Theory Approach
2.1 Private Value Auction
A classic paper that founded auction theory is Vickrey (1961) and we will use the
terminology developed there. A private value auction occurs when each bidder
has a private valuation of the players worth that is unique so that there is no
common market value attached to the player. In this case, the true value of the
player is just equal to the private valuation and the winning bidder will be the
one with the highest private valuation. Vickey (1961) showed that the winning
bid will be the same regardless of the type of auction (ascending bid, descending
bid, rst price sealed bid, second price sealed bid) so that the auctioneer and
the seller are indi¤erent between the type of auction. Club owners may very
well assign di¤erent valuations to the same free agent player since the players
revenue generating potential may di¤er across clubs. Unfortunately this sort
of auction does not get us very far in explaining the posting system in MLB.
The fact that the Commissioner only accepts sealed bids is irrelevant, an old
2For a review of the transfer scandal in England in 2006, see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/eng_prem/5398006.stm
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fashioned cattle auction would do just as well. The role of the Commissioner as
the auctioneer can only be explained as a practice to prevent collusion between
a Japanese club and a MLB club. The Japanese club does not learn who the
winning bidder is unless the bid is accepted. Why a Japanese club would collude
with a MLB club in a private value auction is not clear. If the Japanese club
wishes only to secure the highest bid, it will regardless of the type of auction and
whether the Commissioner opens the bids or the Japanese club opens the bids.
In a private value auction, colluding would only pay o¤ if the Japanese club is
willing to accept a bid below the highest bid in exchange for a side payment.
Then the value of the lower bid plus the side payment would have to exceed
the highest bid. Why would the colluding MLB club not just increase its sealed
bid? Many of the interesting features of the posting system cannot be explained
well if a private value auction is assumed.
Clearly it is necessary to consider the objectives of the parties involved in the
posting system. This is straightforward for the Japanese club selling the player:
obtain the maximum amount that any club in MLB is willing to pay - maximize
the winning bid. This requires a bidding system where the top clubs in MLB
cannot collude and "take turns" winning each auction. The sealed bid approach
prevents collusion, since, even if a number of clubs agree to collude, clubs have
an incentive to cheat on their agreement since the bid cannot be seen by other
clubs and will not be divulged by the Commissioner unless it is the winning bid.
If the winning bidder is a cheater, then the return from cheating must exceed
any penalty strategy that the other colluding clubs could enforce, if it could be
enforced at all. In a repeated game, Eichberger (1993) showed that a cheating
strategy will dominate a colluding strategy in the context of a cartel the shorter
the expected life span of the cheating rm and the higher the discount rate.
This could be the case for MLB where prots might be short-lived.
The objective of MLB clubs is to minimize the winning bid, perhaps to avoid
a winners curse, although these could be considered two seperate objectives.
Colluding can serve this purpose and the sealed bid auction makes this di¢ cult.
Also it might be relatively easy for the Commissioner to detect collusion when
opening all of the bids. The objectives of the Commissioner in the posting
system are di¢ cult to determine without resorting to some subjective opinion.
The posting system was set up to address a problem in the free agent market:
the raiding of Japans best players by MLB. Clearly by agreeing to set up the
posting system, the Commissioner is commiting to x the problem. Then again,
the Commissioner is voted into o¢ ce by a majority of MLB owners and may
be inuenced by them in running the posting system. This inuence could be
reected in lowering the winning bid so that more clubs have a chance of being
the winning bidder. This sort of "fairness" and equity is reected in other MLB
business practices established and approved by owners, such as revenue sharing,
a luxury tax and equal shares in television revenue.
2.2 Public Value Auction
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To further motivate our analysis, we will assume that free agent baseball players
are sold at common value auctions where the player has a true value that is
unknown to the bidding clubs, but is revealed sometime after the auction (when
the player plays a signicant number of games). We will also assume that the
distribution of clubs is known to all bidders, but each club does not know its
position within the distribution. Each bidder simply assumes that its bid is the
highest bid in the distribution. These assumptions impose a restriction that the
revenue potential of a free agent player is the same for all bidders - the bidders
may put in di¤ering bids, but when the players true value is revealed (marginal
revenue product), it will be the mean of the bid distribution. The simplest case
is that of a uniform distribution of bids. Suppose there are N bidders uniformly
distributed from the lowest valuation club to the highest valuation club. The
players true market valuation is not known, but if bidders are rational and
utilize all information about the players worth, we can assume each bidder will
assume the true market valuation is the mean of the bid distribution they use.
The winning bidder clearly will su¤er a winners curse and bid too high for
the player. Knowing this, each bidding club will shade its bid, meaning that it
will lower its bid in order to reduce, but not completely eliminate, the winners
curse. Bid shading is tricky since the bidding club with the highest valuation
might shade its bid too much and not win the auction.
As Vickrey (1961) notes, there are many di¤erent bid-shading strategies that
will not change the outcome of the auction, but the important point is that bids
will be shaded in a public value auction. This is clearly not in the interest of
the Japanese club selling the player. Vickrey (1961) also shows that the fewer
the number of bidders, the less each bid will be shaded. It should be in the best
interests of the Japanese club to encourage fewer bidders, and in fact, there
are typically fewer than ve clubs bidding for a player in the posting system
(although there is no restriction). What type of auction minimizes the winners
curse and thus increases revenue for the seller? Milgrom and Weber (1982)
considered the problem and ranked four auction types according to highest
revenue: ascending bid, second-price sealed bid, rst-price sealed bid, and last
a descending bid auction. The rst-price sealed bid auction used in the posting
system will increase the winners curse and thus result in more bid shading.
A more protable method for the Japanese club is to allow MLB clubs to bid
directly with the Japanese club in an open auction over the internet or telephone.
However the Commissioner of MLB is paid by MLB club owners, can be voted
out by MLB club owners and probably acts in the interest of MLB club owners.
So the use of the rst-price sealed bid auction can be argued as beneting MLB
club owners. Allowing an ascending auction, either through the Commissioners
o¢ ce or directly with the Japanese club, is not in the interests of MLB.
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3 Foreclosure of Competitive Bidding
Whether a private value or public value auction, there is a potential in the
posting system for one bidder to foreclose on all other bidders. Foreclosure
means that one bidder prevents all other bidders from obtaining the rights to
negotiate with the Japanese player, even though the winning bidder has no
intention of signing the player to a contract. This strategy could be used by
one of two or more clubs that are strong rivals, for instance, the Boston Red
Sox and the New York Yankees. The Red Sox owner simply submits a sealed
bid that is inated beyond the reasonable bid submitted by the owner of the
Yankees3 . Since the Red Sox owner has no intention of signing the Japanese
player to a contract, but merely wishes to prevent the Yankees from obtaining
the players negotiation rights, the size of the winning bid has no relevance. The
Japanese player cannot re-enter the posting system until the next o¤-season, so
the foreclosure is e¤ective and costless.
If strong rivalries are prevalent in MLB, foreclosing might prevent the posting
system from operating at all. MLB clubs that anticipate foreclosing behavior
by a rival club simply wont bother making a bid and market failure results.
The only players who will make the jump from Japan to MLB will be marginal
players that have little impact on the relative strengths of MLB clubs. Ratio-
nal Japanese clubs that anticipate receiving the much needed transfer revenues
would surely anticipate foreclosing behavior and insist that some mechanism be
built into the posting system to prevent foreclosure. Allowing MLB clubs to bid
directly with the Japanese club will not prevent foreclosure of competitive bid-
ding. One solution is suggested from the insurance literature. MLB clubs could
be required to pay a "deductible" for the right to enter the bidding process.
Only the winning bidder would lose the deductible if it failed to agree to a con-
tract with the Japanese player. The deductible would need to be high enough to
discourage foreclosure and to give the posting system credibility to the Japanese
club. Unfortunately the use of a deductible may prevent some lower revenue
MLB clubs from bidding, since there is always some positive probability that the
honest winning bidder will not be able to reach a contract agreement with the
Japanese player. Currently, a deductible is not a feature of the posting system,
perhaps for this reason. Alternatively, the posting system could be changed to
allow a Japanese player to re-enter the system during the designated posting
period if contract negotiations fail. Foreclosure could still occur if the winning
bidder drags on contract negotiations to the end of the posting period.
The role of the Commissioners o¢ ce in the bidding process may be to pre-
vent foreclosure. The Commissioner assumedly has access to nancial data of
the winning bidder that the Japanese club does not and may be able to deter-
mine if a bid is illegitimate. The Boston Red Sox can a¤ord to pay $51 million
for the negotiating rights to Daisuke Matsuzaka - the Commissioner knows this
3By reasonable, economics suggests that the owner of the Yankees will submit a bid that
has an upper bound equal to the anticipated surplus that the player will generate over and
above the anticipated salary.
6
from nancial statements. If the lowly Florida Marlins made the same winning
bid, the Commissioner might question the legitimacy of the bid based on the
Marlins poor nancial statements. In this way, the Commissioner can act as
a lter between the winning bid and the Japanese club. If this is indeed the
role of the Commissioner in the posting system, there is no reason the Japanese
professional league would not agree to involving the Commissioners O¢ ce in
the process.
4 The European Transfer System
The European transfer system can best be described, using the terminology
of Vickrey (1961), as an ascending bid auction where the winning bid is just
slightly higher than the second highest bidder and less than the winning bid-
ders valuation. Unlike the baseball posting system, football clubs are free to
negotiate with each other for transfer fees within the two transfer "windows".
If negotiations break down within the transfer window, teams are free to re-
enter the transfer market and negotiate a transfer fee with any other interested
bidder. In a public value auction, Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that an
ascending bid auction will generate the greatest transfer fee and the smallest
winners curse. This keeps the players surplus in the hands of the owners who
will ideally be willing to bid up to the anticipated surplus. This also keeps player
salaries lower than would otherwise be the case with North American type free
agency since winning bidders most certainly still su¤er a winners curse and
will have less money left over for salaries. The winners curse is not nearly as
painful for European football clubs as it is for MLB clubs in the posting system.
Most European clubs are buyers and sellers in a very atomistic market. The
"net" winners curse may be close to zero, but certainly it is reduced by buying
and selling, particularly over a number of years. Bid shading will not be very
frequent or very large.
5 Conclusions
This paper began by descibing the posting system used by MLB and the Japanese
Professional League and then posed the question why the posting system was
designed the way it is. Why did the posting system not replicate the features
of the European transfer system? Three curious features of the posting sys-
tem were identied: the use of a rst-price sealed bid auction, the use of the
Commissioners O¢ ce as an auctioneer, and the inability of the Japanese club
to learn the identity of the winning bidder until after the bid is accepted. The
rst-price sealed bid auction maximizes the winners curse in a public value
auction, resulting in more bid shading and lower bids (although the Seibu Lions
are probably still very happy with a $51 million bid for Daisuke Matsuzaka).
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This could be to the advantage of MLB clubs who will pay lower transfer fees.
The Commissioner as auctioneer could be to prevent foreclosure of competing
bids, particularly if two or more rival clubs are considering placing bids. This
is to the benet of the Japanese club and avoids market failure. Maintaining
the secrecy of the winning bidder prevents collusion between MLB clubs and
Japanese clubs. Such acts of collusion are to the detriment of other bidding
clubs and possibly to the Japanese player. In summary, the posting system is a
compromise between MLB clubs and Japanese professional clubs.
Why settle for a compromise solution? Could the European transfer system
serve as a better model? Not likely. The ascending bid type auction used in
Europe minimizes the winners curse and maximizes the winning bid. If there
is a winners curse, it is small and can be o¤set through sales of players. This
requires a busy transfer market, not a problem in Europe. In contrast, the
posting market is just not busy enough and North American players do not
frequently move to Japan for a transfer fee, hence there is no opportunity for
MLB clubs to o¤set the winners curse, so they do so by shading their bids.
This sort of asymmetric transfer market does not adapt well to the European
system. Trade must go both ways to be benecial to both parties.
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